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Abstract
The decision to classify line items as special items or core earnings is de-
signed to signal item persistence. Using information other than persistence,
such as the sign of the line item, is known as classification shifting. Although
classification shifting is widely seen as earnings management, we demonstrate
in a simple classification and reporting game that the commonly observed re-
porting patterns arise when no misreporting occurs. In fact, signaling per-
sistence rather than misreporting explains additional empirical findings that
a misreporting story cannot address. Overall, strategic classification imposes
a surprising amount of structure on reports, and we argue that it would be
ill-advised to set policy based on a presumption that classification shifting is
earnings management.
Keywords—classification shifting; earnings management; signaling
1 Introduction
Firms have some discretion in how they classify items, and they use it. Losses are more likely
to appear as special items, gains as top-line revenue. This asymmetry is widely presented
as evidence of earnings manipulation (for early arguments along these lines, see Gonedes,
1975, Ronen and Sadan, 1975, Barnea et al., 1976; more recent examples include McVay,
2006, Fan et al., 2010, and Poonawala and Nagar, 2019). The Securities and Exchange
Commission appears to find this evidence convincing, as it has issued several Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases based on apparent classification shifting (see McVay,
2006; Alfonso et al., 2015; Abdalla, 2016; Abdalla and Clubb, 2016, for examples and
discussion).
Attempts to find direct evidence of misleading classifications, however, point to a different
story. Riedl and Srinivasan (2010) find that signaling, rather than deceiving, better explains
firms’ classification decisions. Others have found that Big-N auditors do not systematically
alter classifications (Abernathy et al., 2014), and that corporate governance does not show
a consistent relationship with classifications (Joo and Chamberlain, 2017). These findings
starkly contrast with observed effects of stricter audit and tighter governance on earnings
manipulations, which are associated with reduced apparent accruals manipulation (Klein,
2002; Chen et al., 2015) and substitution with harder to detect real earnings management
Cohen et al. (2008). In what follows, we demonstrate that firms signaling their performance
through classification decisions leads to the asymmetry that the empirical literature doc-
uments. To state this more pointedly, ignoring isolated examples, classification shifting is
not earnings management.
We present our argument in a game between a firm and a representative investor. The
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firm’s line items are hard information, which the firm releases truthfully. Additionally, the
firm has soft information about how persistent its items are. The firm ranks each item by
persistence, and decides on a threshold. Items less persistent than the threshold are placed
in a diferent section of the income statement, labeled noncore earnings (which we sometimes
call special items). Those at least as persistent as the threshold are labeled core earnings.
The firm can choose any threshold it likes, but cannot credibly disclose its threshold. Upon
seeing the report, the investor prices the firm at its expected value.
It is easy to see that a firm maximizes its market value by convincing the investor that its
positive items are more persistent than its negative ones. Firms with more persistent good
news therefore try to separate from those with less persistent good news. We show that a
surprising degree of separation occurs in equilibrium.
Two assumptions in our analysis are worth discussing here. First, the restriction to binary
classifications is typical in practice (on this point, see Dye, 2002), and matches common
empirical specifications. Moreover, we show below that this assumption is far less restrictive
than it might seem.
The second crucial assumption in our argument is that persistence is soft information, but
an outside authority can make relative comparisons. For example, an outside authority
might not know how persistent sales revenue is, but could judge sales revenue to be more
persistent than gains on disposals of fixed assets. By treating the firm in our model as
choosing a threshold, we are assuming an outside authority can require a firm’s classifica-
tions to respect the persistence ranking, a property we call coherence. Requiring coherence
is in keeping with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), which require auditors
to treat any classifications that mislead about expected values as a misstatement (see Nel-
son et al., 2002). Similarly, McVay (2006) observes that deliberate misclassification violates
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). In our setting, deliberate misclassifica-
tion corresponds to violating coherence, and as our goal is to study strategic classification
that does not violate GAAP, we therefore impose coherence throughout.
It turns out that requiring only coherence, rather than a bright-line standard, is a weak
requirement in the following sense: as the firm’s number of items increases, a report that
is coherent always provides more information to investors than a bright-line standard. An
investor who knows that two given items are both more persistent (or both more transient)
than a given threshold does not receive any information on the ranking of these items. We
show that knowing the ranking is more valuable to investors than knowing which side of a
bright-line each item is on unless the number of items is quite small. In fact, the relative
precision of information to investors from a bright-line standard, relative to one that is only
coherent, becomes arbitrarily small for sufficiently many items.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on clas-
sification shifting. Section 3 describes the model and formally defines coherence. Section 4
compares two benchmarks. The first shows what the investor learns if the firm could com-
mit to an absolute persistence threshold, thought of as a bright-line standard. The second
shows what the investor would learn if the firm could fully reveal the persistence-ranking
of its items. Section 5 shows the amount the firm can signal if it is classifies coherently.
Section 6 provides concluding remarks. All proofs are in Appendix A.
2 Background and Framework
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) allow firms some discretion in classifying
items in the financial statements. Discretion, in turn, has become synonymous with earnings
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management. To clarify, we mean earnings management in the sense of Schipper (1989,
92), who defines earnings management as “purposeful intervention in the external financial
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain.” Taking an informational
rather than a true earnings perspective, Schipper views earnings as information provided to
external end users, and earnings management as interventions that signal-jam, in contrast
to interventions that facilitate the financial reporting process.
There are three behaviors that are widely considered methods of earnings management:
Accrual-based earnings management, real transaction-based earnings management, and
classification shifting. We focus on the third method: classification shifting.
Unlike accrual-based management and the manipulation of real activities, classification
shifting does not change GAAP earnings. Because classification shifting does not affect
the bottom line, and because it depends on item persistence (which is soft information),
it is widely argued that auditors and other authorities do not scrutinize the composition
of GAAP earnings as closely as total bottom-line earnings.1 As evidence firms taking
advantage of this lack of scrutiny, studies commonly point to the fact that special items are
disproportionately negative (e.g., Gonedes, 1975; Ronen and Sadan, 1975; Barnea et al.,
1976; McVay, 2006; Fairfield et al., 2009; Barua et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2010; Lee, 2012;
Behn et al., 2013; Abernathy et al., 2014; Lail et al., 2014; Baik et al., 2016; Fan and Liu,
2017; Malikov et al., 2018; Cain et al., 2019; Fan et al., 2019).
To the extent that classification decisions are not subject to any outside discipline, the classi-
fication itself might simply be viewed by investors as a form of cheap talk. If so, classification
shifting could not qualify as earnings management in Schipper’s sense. Yet classification
1See Nelson et al. (2002); McVay (2006); Barua et al. (2010); Behn et al. (2013); Abernathy
et al. (2014); Alfonso et al. (2015); Malikov et al. (2018), and Poonawala and Nagar (2019) for this
assertion.
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decisions empirically appear to be informative to investors, despite shifting. Empirical
studies present evidence that investors weight special items differently from core earnings
(Haw et al., 2011; Alfonso et al., 2015; Baik et al., 2016), and that investors understand
that firms generally report more persistent items closer to sales on the income statement
(Lipe, 1986; Elliott and Hanna, 1996; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; McVay, 2006). In sum,
investors view classifications as communicating information about persistence. Knowing
this, firms have incentive to manipulate how they classify items.
For these reasons, classification shifting is widely viewed as deliberate misclassification of
items within a financial statement.2 The concept of misclassification, however, requires
some attention. If an item’s persistence is subjective or otherwise soft information, it may
be difficult to say what it means for the firm to have misclassified it. One approach is to
make relative comparisons, which require may be far more objective. An outside authority
could assess whether one item is likely to be more persistent than another, and can use this
relative comparison. We say that the income statement is coherently classified if it respects
the persistence ranking. That is, if the firm classifies a given item as noncore, then the firm
must also classify all items likely to be less persistent as noncore.
Once we have clarified what it means for a firm not to misclassify, we turn to our main
question: if a firm classifies coherently—that is, if it does not misclassify—do its equilibrium
classification decisions match the patterns observed in the empirical literature? Indeed,
they do. Negative items are more likely to show up as noncore earnings, and have a greater
impact on earnings than positive noncore items.
The driving force is signaling. If possible, firms with the same net income but different
2See McVay (2006); Barua et al. (2010); Fan et al. (2010); Haw et al. (2011); Lee (2012); Aber-
nathy et al. (2014); Alfonso et al. (2015); Fan and Liu (2017); Malikov et al. (2018), and Poonawala
and Nagar (2019) for this assertion.
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levels of persistence of their line items classify their items differently. Similar to Milgrom
and Roberts (1986); Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990); Shin (1994, 2003), firms classify in order
to distinguish themselves from firms with comparable income but less persistent good news,
and investors interpret the classifications skeptically. By pushing bad news into special
items and good news into core earnings, a firm indicates that its bad news is less persistent
than its good news. A firm with the same income but more persistent bad news could
not mimick without violating coherence. For this reason, there is no pooling equilibrium,
and although full separation may not always be possible, firms in equilibrium separate as
much as they can. As long as an auditor or court or other authority can impose coherence,
differences in classifications make investors more informed, and the investor responses to
classifications are a result of reduced information asymmetry.3
3 The model
There are two players, a representative investor and a firm. The investor aims to value the
firm at its expected net present value, given the firm’s financial report and discount rate
r ∈ (0, 1). The firm wants to maximize its market value. Both players are risk neutral and
have rational expectations.
The firm’s information has two parts. First, the firm has n current period items, x1, . . . , xn,
each equal to 1 or −1 (similar to the coding in Arya et al., 2000)). Keeping the magnitude
of the items the same is without loss of generality: if we had xi = 2xj , we could split xi
3Several studies have likewise questioned whether discretionary accruals are evidence of earnings
management, or if signaling is often a more plausible explanation. See Subramanyam (1996); Ball
(2013); Bertomeu et al. (2019). For a related analysis showing that patterns commonly associated
with earnings manipulation arise as statistical artifacts, see Hemmer and Labro (2019).
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into two identical items, each of the same magnitude as xj .
The firm publicly reports these items before the investor prices the firm. Denote the
income statement as x := (x1, . . . , xn) and net income as I :=
∑n
i=1 xi. Because the
report is public and truthful, the prior distribution of x˜ is inconsequential for most of what
follows. Nevertheless, imposing a prior will be useful below for some comparisons, and we
accordingly assume that Pr(x˜i = 1) = 1/2 and that the x˜i are independently drawn.
The second part of the firm’s information is a private, n-dimensional signal α˜ about the
persistence of each item. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, αi ∈ [1, 1 + 1/r]. If αi = 1, then xi is
completely transitory, and if αi = 1 + 1/r, then xi is a perpetuity. Generically, αi is the
present value factor of the ith item, including the current period’s contribution.
For simplicity and with no loss of generality, normalize the firm’s initial value to zero.
To focus on the information content in each item, we treat the α˜i as independent and
identically distributed, and for convenience we assume a uniform distribution. Given x and
α, the firm’s present value v is
v =
n∑
i=1
αixi
Let v˜ represent the investor’s prior value of v. After receiving the report x, the investor
forms posterior beliefs about α˜ and updates its estimate of v˜. The true value of α is soft
information, which the firm cannot credibly disclose. However, the ranking of the individual
components (α˜1, . . . , α˜n) can be confirmed.4 Although in principle the firm could disclose
this ranking, we assume that for exogenous reasons it cannot do so, in order to make our
4Cianciaruso and Sridhar (2018) also combine hard information with verifiable properties of soft
information. They address a different issue from ours: they are interested in the interaction of
voluntary and mandatory disclosures, whereas our focus is mandatory disclosure with discretion in
classifications.
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classifications comparable to those in the empirical literature.
Instead, the firm signals information about α by classifying items in x. To do this, the firm
partitions {1, . . . , n} into two subsets, H and L. It lists {xi|i ∈ H} at the top of the income
statement and {xi|i ∈ L} at the bottom of the income statement. We interpret H as core
income and L as special items. This corresponds to the empirical finding that investors
weight items based on income statement placement (Lipe, 1986; Elliott and Hanna, 1996;
Fairfield et al., 1996; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Burgstahler et al., 2002; McVay, 2006;
Bartov and Mohanram, 2014). We require the classification to be coherent, i.e., every core
item must be more persistent than every special item.
Definition 1. The partition {L,H} of {1, . . . , n} is coherent if, for every i ∈ L and
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if αj ≤ αi, then j ∈ L.
Definition 1 implies that, for any i ∈ H and any j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if αj ≥ αi, then j ∈ H. So,
a classification is coherent if the firm sorts the entries of α and cuts the sorted list.
The investor cannot distinguish the items except by their classification and whether they
are positive or negative. Therefore, the total gains and losses in each classification are
sufficient statistics for the information the investor receives:
x = (xH , xL), where xH :=
(∑
i∈H
max{xi, 0},
∑
i∈H
min{xi, 0}
)
and xL :=
(∑
i∈L
max{xi, 0},
∑
i∈L
min{xi, 0}
)
For example, suppose a firm with 10 positive and 10 negative items classifies 7 positive
and 4 negative items as core. Then its report is ((7,−4), (3,−6)). Total firm income is
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10− 10 = 0, core income is 7− 4 = 3, and net special items are 3− 6 = −3.
Given the income statement and classification, the investor values the firm at
E[v˜|xH , xL]
Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events.
Nature chooses
item values and
and persistence
Firm classifies
items and
issues report
Investor
prices firm
Figure 1 – Sequence of events.
4 Benchmarks
4.1 Bright-line threshold
We begin by providing a benchmark under which the firm can credibly commit to classyfing
based on an absolute persistence threshold, that is, under a bright-line standard. We limit
attention to what is essential for comparisons. Dye (2002) provides a thorough treatment
of the consequences of imposing an absolute threshold if the firm can manipulate its clas-
sifications at cost. Dye and Verrecchia (1995) discuss the benefits of a uniform versus a
discretionary standard in an agency-theoretic setting. We do not revisit these issues and
refer the interested reader to the respective articles.
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Let αˆ be the firm’s bright-line cutoff. That is, suppose for this section that
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
 i ∈ L, if αi < αˆi ∈ H, if αi ≥ αˆ
The investor’s mean squared error in estimating v˜ given cutoff αˆ is
η(αˆ) := E[(v˜ − E[v˜|x, αˆ])2|x, αˆ]
= E

∑
i∈L
(
α˜i − 1 + αˆ
2
)
xi +
∑
j∈H
(
α˜j − 1 + 1/r + αˆ
2
)
xj
2 (1)
The following proposition provides our benchmark:
Proposition 1. The investor’s mean squared error η(αˆ) is minimized at the prior mean of
the α˜i, i.e., at
α¯ := 1 +
1
2r
At this cutoff, the mean squared error given the report is
η(α¯) =
n
48r2
Proposition 1 gives a bound on how much information the investor could receive from a
perfectly enforced bright-line standard. The investor’s estimation error increases linearly
in the number of items n.
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4.2 Persistence ranking
We now consider an alternative benchmark, under which the firm is not held to a bright-line
standard, but can reveal the persistence ranking of its items.
For convenience, we introduce the following notation:
g =
n∑
i=1
max{xi, 0} = total gains (positive items)
` = n− g = −
n∑
i=1
min{xi, 0} = total losses (negative items)
xH,1 = first coordinate of xH = core revenues
xH,2 = second coordinate of xH = core expenses
xL,1, xL,2 = first and second coordinates of xL analogous to xH,1, xH,2
k = xH,1 − xH,2 = core items
n− k = xL,1 − xL,2 = net special items
α˜(i) = i
th persistence order statistic
Example 1. Let x = ((7,−2), (4,−6)). Then
g = 11 ` = 8
xH,1 = 7 xH,2 = −2
xL,1 = 4 xL,2 = −6
k = 9 n− k = 11
Net income I = 3, core income is xH,1+xH,2 = 5, and net special items are xL,1+xL,2 = −2.
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The sample order statistics α˜(i) are the values from sorting α˜ in ascending order:
α˜(1) ≤ α˜(2) ≤ · · · ≤ α˜(n)
The following lemma characterizes the mean and variance associated with the α(i):
Lemma 2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
r(α˜(i) − 1) ∼ Beta(i, n− 1 + 1)
Consequently,
E[α˜(i)] = 1 +
i
r(n+ 1)
V ar[α˜(i)] =
i(n− i+ 1)
(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)r2
The following result shows that, unless the total number of items is small, the investors
learn more if the firm reveals the α˜(i) than if it reveals whether each α˜i is above or below
a bright-line threshold. In fact, we get a sharp cutoff at 7 items.
Theorem 3. If the firm can credibly reveal the α˜(i), then the mean-square error in the
investor’s estimate of v˜, conditional on the report, is
n
6(n+ 1)r2
Therefore, investors are weakly (resp. strictly) better off from knowing the persistence rank-
ing than they are from knowing if each item is more or less persistent than a bright-line
threshold if and only if n ≥ (resp. >)7.
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Comparing Proposition 1 and Theorem 3, we see that the investor’s mean-squared error in
estimating v˜ given the α˜(i) asymptotically approaches a constant of 1/(6r2), but that the
estimation error from a bright-line standard grows linearly in n. The relative precision of the
investor’s information from the order statistics, compared with the bright-line classification,
is
6(n+ 1)r2/n
48r2/n
=
n+ 1
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which becomes arbitrarily large.
We end this section by showing that binary classifications suffice to reveal the persistence
ranking, deferring discussion of strategic issues to the next section. The following result
shows the number of ways to estimate v˜ given these weights is never larger than what the
firm can communicate with a binary classification system.
Theorem 4. A binary classification of the income statement is a large enough message
space to communicate every possible valuation based on the α˜(i). In particular, given g
gains and ` = n− g losses, there are
g · `+ 1 possible values of E[v˜|x, α˜(1), . . . , α˜(n)], and
g · `+ 1 + n possible classifications of x = (xH , xL)
Moreover, exactly n+ 1 classifications are consistent with the worst possible ordering (and
exactly one posssible expected firm value consistent with the worst possible ordering).
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5 Coherent classification
We now focus attention on equilibria in which the firm is restricted to classifying coherently
(see Definition 1). We note that there are many Bayesian Nash equilbria in our game. Even
if we refine the equilibria by the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987), the equilibrium
is not unique. Nevertheless, we can characterize strategies that are coherent and not strictly
dominated, in a sense we elaborate on below. This characterization is the best that can
reasonably be hoped for, as the firm’s objective is in essence a knapsack problem embedded
in a signaling game.5
Example 2 illustrates how the investor uses the expected values of the α˜(i):
Example 2. Suppose n = 2. There are three possible values of net income I:
• I = 2. Regardless of the classification, the investor estimates the firm’s value as
E[v˜|xH , xL] = E[α˜(1)] · 1 + E[α˜(2)] · 1 = 2 +
∑2
i=1 i
3r
= 2 +
1
r
• I = −2. Regardless of the classification, the investor estimates the firm’s value as
E[v˜|xH , xL] = −2− 1
r
• I = 0. Then there are four possible reports:
(xH , xL) ∈ {((0,−1), (1, 0)) , ((1, 0), (0,−1)) , ((1,−1), (0, 0)) , ((0, 0), (1,−1))}
5The knapsack problem, which dates to at least Mathews (1897), is a constrained partitioning
problem. It is known to be NP-hard.
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Consider each:
Case 1 xH = (0,−1), xL = (1, 0). By coherence, α˜(1) is associated with the positive
item in xL, and α˜(2) is associated with the negative item in xH . The investor
values the firm at
E[v˜|(0,−1), (1, 0)] = 1 + 1
3r
− 1− 2
3r
= − 1
3r
Case 2 xH = (1, 0), xL = (0,−1). By a symmetric argument to Case 1,
E[v˜|(1, 0), (0,−1)] = 1
3r
Cases 3 and 4 Either xH = (0, 0) or xL = (0, 0). Coherence does not restrict the sample order
statistics of α˜. Depending on the firm’s strategy and whether it randomizes, the
expected value of the firm can be anything in
[− 13r , 13r ].
In Example 2, there is full separation in every equilibrium. If both items have the same sign,
then the classification does not matter. If the items have opposite signs and the positive
item is more persistent, then the firm classifies as xH = (1, 0), xL = (0,−1). If the items
have opposite signs and the negative item is more persistent, then the firm can classify as
any of {xH = (0, 0), xL = (1,−1);xH = (1,−1), xL = (0, 0);xH = (0,−1), xL = (1, 0)}. In
this last case, classifying all items as core or all items as special items does not violate the
intuitive criterion; hence, the intuitive criterion does not select a unique equilbrium.
We further note that, in any rational expectations equilibrium, if the items have different
signs and the positive item is more persistent, then the positive item always ends up as core
income and the negative one as a special item. This does not necessiarly occur when the
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positive item is less persistent. Signaling alone generates the asymmetry that the empirical
literature documents.6
The next example shows that complete separation is not always possible.
Example 3. Suppose n = 4 and g = 2. There are 6 orderings of x from least to most
persistent:
Table 1 – Possible orderings, 4 items, 2 positive
Permutation Items, least to most persistent E[v˜| persistence ranking]
1 (1, 1,−1,−1) − 4
5r
2 (1,−1, 1,−1) − 2
5r
3a (−1, 1, 1,−1) 0
3b (1,−1,−1, 1) 0
4 (−1, 1,−1, 1) 2
5r
5 (−1,−1, 1, 1) 4
5r
There are 9 possible classifications (xH , xH). Among these:
• ((2, 0), (0,−2)) is coherent if and only if x is permutation 5. The firm optimally
classifies permutation 5 this way.
• ((2,−1), (0,−1)) is coherent if and only if x is permutation 3a, 4, or 5. The firm
optimally classifies permutation 3a this way.
• ((1, 0), (1,−2)) is coherent if and only if x is permutation 3b, 4, or 5. The firm
optimally classifies permutation 3b this way.
• ((1,−1), (1,−1)) is coherent if and only if x is permutation 2, 3a, 3b, or 4. The firm
optimally classifies permutation 2 this way.
6For supportive empirical results see Lipe (1986); Dechow and Ge (2006); Riedl and Srinivasan
(2010); Abdalla (2016); Abdalla and Clubb (2016). Similar findings about firms using principles-
based standards to signal are in Folsom et al. (2017). A theoretical argument consistent with Folsom
et al. is in Dye and Sridhar (2008).
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• The remaining 5 classifications are coherent for permutation 1. The firm can choose
any of these for permutation 1.
For permutation 4, the firm optimally classifies as any mixture between ((2,−1), (0,−1))
and ((1, 0), (1,−2)).
Example 3 shows a common feature of the equilibria. As in Milgrom and Roberts (1986);
Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990), and Shin (1994, 2003), the firm selects a classification that
maximizes the most pessimistic interpretation of its news. This most pessimistic interpre-
tation need not be unique, and some permutations (such as Permutation 4 in the example)
may not be the most pessimistic interpretation of any values of (xH , xL).
One complication in the current setting, not present in Milgrom and Roberts (1986); Okuno-
Fujiwara et al. (1990); Shin (1994, 2003), is that the possible classifications may be incom-
pletely ranked. Figure 2 shows the ordering of possible core income reports (xH,1, xH,2) for
Example 3, in which there are two positive and two negative items.
(2, 0)
(2,−1) (1, 0)
(1,−1)
{(xH,1, xH,2)|xH,1 = 0 or xH,2 = −2}
Figure 2 – Ranking of core income reports for firm with 2 positive and 2 negative
items. Both (2,−1) and (1, 0) indicate core income of 1 (and therefore net special
items of −1).
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From Figure 2, we can see a natural condition that provides a strict dominance ranking.
We state this below:
Definition 2. Fix n and g. Then core income report xH = (xH,1, xH,2) strictly dominates
x′H = (x
′
H,1, x
′
H,2) if every permutation {(x(i), α(i))}ni=1 for which report x is coherent implies
at least as high a present value of v as any permutation for which x′ is coherent, with at
least one strict inequality.
Proposition 5. Let xH , x′H be two core income reports for fixed n, g. Suppose xH,1 ≥
x′H,1, xH,2 ≥ x′H,2, and at least one inequality is strict. Then xH strictly dominates x′H .
To understand Proposition 5, refer again to Figure 2. Core income reports (2,−1) and
(1, 0) both strictly dominate core income report (1,−1) and are both strictly dominated by
core income report (2, 0).
An immediate consequence of Proposition 5 is that in any rational expectations equilibrium,
a firm will never classify in a way in which both core revenues and core expenses can both
be improved. This generates a pattern of firms classifying in a way that increases core
income.
Our last result provides some quantification of the amount of pooling that can occur in
equilbrium. We show that in a sense the amount of pooling is small.
Theorem 6. For any given n > 2, the number of undominated coherent classifications is
always less than 1/4 the total number of coherent classifications.
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6 Discussion and conclusion
Classifications are designed to provide information to the end users of financial reports.
Our requirement of coherence states that these classifications can change on the fly and do
not need to depend on any fixed notion of how transient an item must be to count as a
special item. All that is required is that the firm’s financial report can be held to its own
standard. Saying that one item is so transient that it must count as a special item prevents
a firm from saying an even more transient item is part of core earnings.
Our results explain the empirical findings that investors react to classifications, that firms
tend to classify losses as special items and gains as core earnings, and that variation in audi-
tor and in corporate governance does not systematically affect the amount of discretionary
classification.
In policy terms, our results suggest that strategic classification is largely benign, at least
to the extent that firms classify coherently. Some information is lost to pooling, but the
overall amount lost is in a sense small. By contrast, an alternative policy of imposing a
bright-line classification standard is clearly not in investors’ interest, particularly for large
or complex firms.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. By independence, we can consider each α˜i individually. For any
random variable y˜ and any constant γ,
E[(y˜ − γ)2] = E[y˜2]− 2γE[y˜] + γ2
Differentiating with respect to γ gives
−2E[y˜] + 2γ = 0 ⇒ γ = E[y˜]
It is immediate that the second derivative is 2, so that γ = E[y˜] gives the unique global
minimum, and the squared deviation is the variance of y˜.
By the uniformity of the α˜i, each i is equally likely to be in L or H. Therefore, the mean
squared error is minimized where the variance of α˜i is equal for i ∈ L as for i ∈ H. This is
easily seen to be at the midpoint α¯ = 1 + 1/(2r).
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Finally, the variance of a uniform draw over [1, 1 + 1/(2r)] (or over [1 + 1/(2r), 1 + 1/r] is
1/(12(2r)2) = 1/(48r2). Over n independent draws, the total variance is n/(48r2).
Proof of Lemma 2. For each i, α˜i ∼ U [1, 1 + 1/r], so
r(α˜i − 1) ∼ U [0, 1]
and r(α˜− 1)(i) = r(α˜(i)− 1), i.e., the order is the same as the ordering of the α(i). The pdf
f(i)(·) of the ith sample order statistic of n iid random variables with distribution F (·) and
density f(·) is
f(i)(t) =
n!
(i− 1)!(n− i)!F
i−1(t)[1− F (t)]n−if(t)
For a U [0, 1] variable, F (t) = t, 1 − F (t) = 1 − t, and f(t) = 1. Therefore, using Γ(k) =
(k − 1)! for positive integer k,
f(i)(t) =
Γ(n+ 1)
Γ(i)Γ(n− i+ 1) t
i−1(1− t)n−i
which is the pdf of a Beta(i, n− i+ 1)-distributed random variable (see Arnold et al., 2008,
for discussion).
The mean and variance of a Beta(a, b)-distributed random variable are a/(a+b) and ab/[(a+
b)2(a+ b+ 1)]. Therfore,
E[r(α˜(i) − 1] =
i
n+ 1
⇒ E[α˜(i)] = 1 +
i
r(n+ 1)
V ar[r(α˜(i) − 1] =
i(n− i+ 1)
(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)r2
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Proof of Theorem 3. From Lemma 2, the investor’s mean-squared error in estimating v˜
given a report that reveals the order statistics is
n∑
i=1
i(n− i+ 1)
(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)r2
=
1
(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)r2
[
(n+ 1)
n∑
i=1
i−
n∑
i=1
i2
]
=
n(n+ 1)2/2− n(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)/6
(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)r2
=
n
6(n+ 1)r2
(2)
From Proposition 1, the investor’s mean-squared error in estimating v˜ from a fully revealed
bright-line classification standard is n/(48r2). This error is weakly greater than that of
learning the order statistics (2) if and only if
n
48r2
≥ n
6(n+ 1)r2
⇔ n ≥ 7
Proof of Theorem 4. An immediate corollary of Lemma 2 is that, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
E[α˜(i+1)]− E[α˜(i)] =
1
r(n+ 1)
,
i.e., the expected weights are evenly spaced. The number of possible values of the firm is
therefore equivalent to the number of possible ways to sum g integers chosen from {1, . . . , n},
i.e., to determine the possible weighted sums of g positive items. This total plus knowledge
of g and n are sufficient for determining the sum of the negative items and therefore of the
firm’s present value.
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The smallest possible sum of g integers from {1, . . . , n} is
g∑
i=1
i =
g(g + 1)
2
The largest possible sum of g integers from {1, . . . , n} is
n∑
i=n−g+1
i =
n∑
i=1
i−
n−g∑
j=i
j =
n(n+ 1)
2
− (n− g)(n− g + 1)
2
Because the integers in {1, . . . , n} are consecutive, any integer sum between the smallest
and largest possible sum is attainable. Therefore, the total number of possible sums is one
plus the difference between the largest and smallest possible sum. Noting that ` = n − g,
this total is (after some substitutions)
g(g + 1)
2
− n(n+ 1)
2
− `(`+ 1)
2
= g · `+ 1
With a binary classification system, there are {0, . . . , g} possible values of xH,1 and {0, . . . , `}
possible values of xH,2. These fully determine the binary classifications, so there are a total
of
(g + 1)(`+ 1) = g · `+ g + `+ 1 = g · `+ n+ 1
possible ways to report with a binary classification.
Finally, among the possible classification profiles, there are g + 1 with xH,1 = 0 and ` + 1
with xH,2 = `, and exactly one report (xH = (0, 0)) consistent with both. This gives
n + 1 classification profiles that do not separate from the worst possible ordering, g · `
classification profiles that do, and g · ` possible orderings that are better than the worst
possible ordering.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose xH,1 = x′H,1 and xH,2 = x
′
H,2 + 1. Let k be the number
of core items in report x, i.e., xH,1 − xH,2, and define k′ similarly for x′. As x has one
fewer core expense than x′ and the same number of core revenues, we have k = k′ − 1. Let
x(n−k′+1) be the (k′)th most persistent item . If x(n−k′+1) = −1, then the sequence can be
reported as either x or x′. If x(n−k′+1) = 1, then sequence can be reported as x but not as
x′. Thus every sequence reportable as x′ is either also reportable as x or differs by making
one negative item more persistent.
The case where xH,1 = x′H,1 + 1 and xH,2 = x
′
H,2 is similar, and the general result follows
from induction.
Proof of Theorem 6. We begin by calculating the maximum number of undominated se-
quences associated with a core income report. Given x, g, and n, the total number of
sequences (including dominated ones) that x coherently classifies is
(
xH,1 − xH,2
xH,1
)(
n− xH,1 + xH,2
g − xH,1
)
=
(
k
xH,1
)(
n− k
xL,1
)
(3)
The reason is as follows: rank the k core income items. Among these, there are xH,1
positive items, which can take any of the possible ranked positions without replacement.
The reasoning is similar among the n− k noncore items, of which xL,1 are positive.
If the lowest-ranked core income item in a sequence is negative, then the firm could have
classified its core income as (xH,1, xL,1 + 1). Similarly, if the highest ranked non-core item
is positive and the lowest-ranked core item is negative, then the firm could have classified
its core income as (xH,1 + 1, xL,1) but not as (xH,1, xL,1 + 1). (The condition that n > 2 is
required here, because of the two items with values that are fixed.) By Proposition 5, the
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number of undominated sequences coherently classified as x is therefore
(
k
xH,1
)(
n− k
xL,1
)
−
(
k − 1
xH,1
)(
n− k
xL,1
)
−
(
k − 1
xH,1 − 1
)(
n− k − 1
xL,1 − 1
)
which after some tedious algebra reduces to
(
k − 1
xH,1 − 1
)(
n− k − 1
xL,1
)
(4)
Noting that k = xH,1 − xH, 2 and summing (4) over xH,1 from 1 to g and −xH,2 from 0 to
n− g − 1 gives the total undominated sequences consistent with n and g as
(n− 1)!
(g − 1)!(n− g)! =
Γ(n)
Γ(g)Γ(n− g) (5)
Scaling (5) by (3) gives the maximum fraction of sequences that are undominated. This
ratio turns out to be
g(n− g)
n(n+ 1)
which is maximized at g = n/2. Substituting gives an upper bound of
n2
4n(n+ 1)
=
1
4 + 1/n
Thus the amount of pooling is always less than 1/4 of the opportunities to pool.
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